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A major task for social scientists is to identify ways 
to combat the spread of  fake news and misinfor-
mation online (Lazer et al., 2018). Fake news – 
news that is designed to look accurate but is 
actually misleading or false – represents a major 
problem for politics, public health, and private life 
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(Grinberg et al., 2019; Vosoughi et al., 2018). 
Despite the fact that online news consumption 
comprises a relatively small amount of  the total 
information consumed by Americans (Allen et al., 
2019), the concern is that fake news and misinfor-
mation campaigns may influence people’s deci-
sions about politics and policies (Aral & Eckles, 
2019; Grinberg et al., 2019), or other important 
aspects of  private life, such as medical decisions 
(Pennycook, Mcphetres, Bago, & Rand, 2020; 
Pennycook, Mcphetres, Zhang, & Rand, 2020).
Political misinformation also represents an 
interesting test-case for broader psychological 
processes relating to political out-group hostility. 
Political polarization and hostility has increased 
in the United States over time (Dimock & Carroll, 
2014), and one factor that contributes to this may 
be misinformation. Thus, it is important to 
understand how political identity influences one’s 
perceptions of  news content and, in particular, 
how Democrats and Republicans are similar or 
different when evaluating information.
Finally, reducing the spread of  fake news 
requires that researchers understand who believes 
and shares fake news and why, so that effective 
routes for intervention can be identified. In 
answering these questions, researchers have most 
often focused on person-level characteristics – 
such as political orientation or cognitive ability – 
and have ignored article-level characteristics. The 
goal of  the present research was to investigate a 
possible characteristic of  headlines that relates to 
out-group hostility and therefore that may make 
them seem more attractive in a politically polar-
ized context: namely, character deprecation.
Who falls for fake news?
Much past research has focused on identifying 
who is likely to share fake news. Often, these 
explanations pit political groups against each 
other – for example, Republicans and Democrats 
comprise the major political groups in the United 
States. Because news is often reported and per-
ceived as favouring one party over the other, 
understanding how political identity influences 
the perception of  news is an important goal for 
social scientists. Thus, when identifying who is 
more likely to fall for fake news, research has 
often investigated political identity alongside 
other individual differences.
Political identity. Studies (Allcott & Gentzkow, 
2017; Guess et al., 2018) report that fake news in 
favour of  Donald Trump was more common 
(and was shared more) than fake news in favour 
of  Hillary Clinton leading up to the 2016 elec-
tion. Additionally, those over 65 years old and 
those identifying as conservative are more likely 
than liberals to share such fake news (Guess et al., 
2019). Research has also identified that conserva-
tive Republicans are slightly worse than Demo-
crats at distinguishing between fake and real news 
(Pennycook & Rand, 2018) and between trust-
worthy and untrustworthy sites (Pennycook & 
Rand, 2019a). However, one article reports mixed 
evidence for political asymmetry (Harper & 
Baguley, 2019), instead finding that people on 
both sides of  the political spectrum are more 
likely to see politically incongruent news as less 
legitimate.
Individual differences. Other research focuses on 
psychological characteristics, showing that 
those who are less likely to think analytically, 
those who are delusion-prone, and those scor-
ing highly on religiosity and dogmatism are 
more likely to believe fake over true news 
(Bronstein et al., 2019; Pennycook & Rand, 
2018). Additionally, some research demon-
strates that people higher in bullshit receptivity 
– that is, more likely to ascribe meaning to ran-
domly generated statements (Pennycook et al., 
2015) – and those who overclaim their knowl-
edge level are more likely to fall for fake news 
(Pennycook & Rand, 2019b).
Why do people share fake news? One hypothesis is 
that people share news not because they are moti-
vated to believe a certain thing, but because they 
are simply not thinking carefully about the news 
content. Specifically, people who score lower on 
analytic thinking are less able to discern between 
fake and real news (Pennycook & Rand, 2018). 
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This finding is supplemented by experimental 
evidence. For example, in online studies, simply 
asking participants to consider whether the head-
line was true or false reduced self-reported inten-
tions of  sharing false (but not true) content 
(Fazio, 2020). Indeed, even asking people to rate 
the accuracy of  a single headline increases the 
overall quality of  the content they report being 
willing to share (Pennycook et al., 2019; Penny-
cook, Mcphetres, Zhang, & Rand, 2020). This 
effect seems to be driven by the act of  delibera-
tion. That is, while one’s initial “intuitive” 
response may be to believe a news headline, giv-
ing people additional time to reconsider reduced 
belief  in fake news (Bago et al., 2020) consistent 
with dual-process accounts of  cognition (Evans 
& Stanovich, 2013).
It may also be that some people share fake 
news because they are poor at distinguishing 
between trustworthy and untrustworthy sources. 
While information about the publisher is not 
enough on its own to reduce the sharing of  fake 
news (Dias et al., 2020), providing crowd-sourced 
ratings of  the trustworthiness of  news sites was 
effective in reducing the self-reported sharing of  
fake news (Pennycook & Rand, 2019a). Finally, 
while all of  the studies examined self-reported 
sharing in an experimental context, some evi-
dence suggests that self-reported sharing corre-
lates positively with actual sharing on Twitter 
(Mosleh et al., 2020).
Another reason that people may share fake 
news is because of  repetition and familiarity. 
Research illustrating the illusory truth effect 
(Alter & Oppenheimer, 2009; Fazio et al., 2015; 
Fazio et al., 2019; Hasher et al., 1977) – the 
hypothesis that repeated presentation is associ-
ated with an increased belief  in truthfulness – has 
been amply illustrated in psychology. As such, 
people are more likely to believe a news story 
they have seen before (Effron & Raj, 2020; 
Pennycook et al., 2018). Such a strategy even 
appears to be effective on Twitter: in one study, 
participants who viewed repeated statements 
tweeted by Donald Trump were more likely to 
believe them compared to non-repeated tweets 
(Murray et al., 2020).
However, the above reasons for sharing fake 
news do not consider the variation in the fake 
news, itself. Indeed, there are many “types” of  
fake news (Tandoc et al., 2018), and fake news 
often has many overlapping characteristics 
(Acerbi, 2019). Thus, different types of  news may 
be more or less attractive to different types of  
people. In the present study, we focus on one 
possible characteristic of  fake news: character 
deprecation.
Character deprecation
Because fake news may be created to influence 
election outcomes or for other propaganda pur-
poses (Grinberg et al., 2019; Jacobson et al., 2016; 
Lazer et al., 2018), the content of  the actual head-
line could take many forms. One possibility is 
that fake news may be created to drum up sup-
port for one candidate by reducing support for 
another candidate. This type of  headline could 
effectively deprecate a candidate’s character by 
providing information that has no direct impact 
on legislation or policy. However, it would target 
their moral character, personality, cognitive abili-
ties, or their ability to do their job in order to 
make them appear less attractive to constituents 
and possible voters.
To illustrate this type of  news, consider the 
following two fake news headlines: “16-year old 
girl claims former president Bill Clinton is her 
father”, and “Assange: Pardon in exchange for 
the name of  Democrat who leaked emails”. The 
former headline suggests that Bill Clinton had an 
affair – an issue that some voters may dislike, but 
is arguably unrelated to policy, legislation, or Bill 
Clinton’s ability to govern. In contrast, the latter 
article is directly tied to policy or legislation 
because it suggests that someone may discover 
which Democrat leaked a set of  emails. While a 
person (Julian Assange) is named in the headline, 
the purpose of  the headline makes no reference 
to his personal character, moral integrity, or 
capability.
Most of  the time, a headline will focus on a 
person’s character with the goal of  making the 
person look bad, either morally, cognitively, 
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personally, or otherwise. While likely infrequent, 
it is conceivable that a headline could make a per-
son look good (morally, personally, etc). For 
example, the fake headline “Donald Trump sent 
his own plane to transport 200 stranded Marines” 
implies that Donald Trump is selfless, caring, and 
philanthropic.
The present studies
In the present studies we simply sought to exam-
ine the extent to which a headline that focuses on 
a person’s character was related to the likelihood 
of  sharing this content on social media. We call 
these headlines “character-focused” headlines for 
simplicity because, although they are almost 
always negatively valanced it is possible that they 
could be positively valanced.
Across two studies, we examined whether par-
tisans were more likely to self-report sharing a 
headline that was focused on a politician’s charac-
ter compared to headlines that were important for 
policy and legislation. In Study 1, we harvested 
fake news headlines which were already in exist-
ence on social media. In Study 2, we applied our 
findings experimentally and created our own bal-
anced set of  “fake” fake news headlines that were 
controlled for partisanship and content. Data, 
materials, and pre-registrations for both studies 
can be accessed at https://osf.io/75che/?view_
only=263bf780d5db4774b4c46af6ced9e54f.
Study 1
The purpose of  Study 1 was to examine whether 
political partisans are more or less likely to share 
fake news that focuses on character-deprecation 
content. During Part 1, we harvested a large sup-
ply of  existing fake news articles from the inter-
net and then pre-tested them to obtain article-level 
ratings from an independent sample of  partici-
pants. We then selected a subset of  the articles to 
be used in Part 2 by matching them on several 
criteria. During Part 2, we asked a separate sam-
ple of  participants if  they were likely to share the 
articles on social media. Our pre-registration plan 
can be accessed at: https://osf.io/pazys/?view_
only=c7b40dbd0719490793a0438fdeb04abd.
Participants and method
Participants. This study was conducted in two 
parts. For Part 1, our sample included 198 partici-
pants from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. For Part 
2, our sample included 206 participants from 
Lucid. Lucid samples are convenience samples in 
that they are not randomly sampled, but people 
opt in based on quota-matching based on age, 
gender, ethnicity, and education. What this means 
is that it is not representative on ideology, 
although the demographics (including on ideol-
ogy) do closely match that of the US (Coppock & 
McClellan, 2019).
We initially recruited 498 participants from 
Lucid, but excluded 282 based on pre-registered 
exclusion criteria (people who reported they 
would not share political content on Facebook). 
The reason for this criterion is because it does 
not make sense to ask people if  they would share 
content on social media if  we already know that 
they never share content on social media. We also 
excluded nine people who selected “other” gen-
der, because this group made too small of  a com-
parison in the regression analysis. However, 
results without these exclusions are nearly identi-
cal. Complete demographics are available in the 
online supplementary materials.
Sample size was determined a priori based on 
a sensitivity analysis showing that a sample size 
of  500 would allow for the detection of  correla-
tion effects as small as r = .05 with 90% power. 
Similarly, a sensitivity analysis shows that a sam-
ple size of  206 will yield correlation effects as 
small as r = .23 and power is significantly 
increased with multiple within-subject ratings.
Part 1. During Part 1, we pre-tested a larger set 
of  79 articles to obtain article-level ratings. The 
headlines had previously been used in a large pre-
test of  fake news stimuli. These headlines were 
selected by browsing various fake news sites and 
other repositories, such as Snopes.com and politi-
fact.org. The final set of  headlines are available at: 
https://osf.io/75che/files/.
Prior to ratings, participants were given a 
detailed explanation and a few “. . . good exam-
ples of  claims that focus on a person’s character 
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because they only include information about the 
personal life of  a politician rather than the poli-
cies that they put in place”. We also gave partici-
pants an explanation and some examples of  
headlines that “. . . focus on a person’s character 
because they actually convey information about a 
political decision or a potential political decision 
(“public policy”)”.
Participants viewed a subset of  15 articles in 
randomized order and rated (a) the extent to 
which each article was focused on a person’s char-
acter, (b) whether it was important for policy, and 
whether it was more favourable for Democrats or 
Republicans. Ratings were made on three-point 
scales (1 = yes, 2 = somewhat, 3 = no). From 
this data we calculated two scores:
Partisanship strength – The extent to which the 
article is strongly pro-Democrat or pro-Repub-
lican. This is an absolute value, computed as the 
difference from scale midpoint.
Character versus policy focus – The extent to 
which the article focused on someone’s charac-
ter relative to policy, computed by subtracting 
the policy score from the character score.
Based on these survey ratings from Part 1, we 
selected 20 articles to use in Part 2: 10 were Pro-
Democrat and 10 were Pro-Republican, half  of  
each focused on a person’s character (with low 
policy importance) and half  were important for 
policy (with low character-focus scores).
Stimuli selection. The final set of  articles was 
selected by matching sets of  pro-Republican and 
pro-Democratic headlines so that the following 
scores were as similar as possible: (a) character focus, 
(b) policy importance, (c) absolute partisanship rat-
ings. Ratings for the full set of  79 articles are avail-
able on the OSF page at: https://osf.io/gbn3f/.
Part 2. During Part 2, all participants were shown 
20 headlines in randomized order and were asked 
how likely they would be to share the articles on 
social media. Past research shows that self-
reported sharing is related to actual sharing on 
social media (Mosleh et al., 2020). After rating all 
headlines, participants completed the cognitive 
reflection test (CRT) (6 items) and demographics 
information.
Results
Confirmatory analysis. Following our pre-registered 
analysis plans (https://osf.io/pazys/?view_only=
c7b40dbd0719490793a0438fdeb04abd), we exam-
ined whether Democrats would share pro-Demo-
cratic articles and whether Republicans would 
share pro-Republican articles. That is, we ignored 
the headlines that did not “match” a person’s polit-
ical preferences (because we were not interested in 
whether they would or would not share this 
information).
We computed a mixed model using the article 
characteristics (e.g., character focus vs. policy 
importance, partisanship strength) and the indi-
vidual’s political orientation to predict whether a 
participant would be likely to share the article on 
Facebook. We included random intercepts for 
participant, and we also included age and gender 
as control variables.
As seen in Table 1, only partisanship strength 
was unrelated to likelihood of  sharing (recall that 
all headlines were politically congenial, albeit not 
to the same degree). Republicans were more likely 
to share fake news, and headlines that were char-
acter-focused (as opposed to important for pol-
icy) were more likely to be shared overall.
Importantly, political orientation interacted 
with the article-level ratings of  character focus 
and partisanship strength. As seen in Figure 1, 
Republicans were more likely to share character-
focused headlines compared to policy-important 
headlines (B = 0.38, p = .01), whereas Democrats 
were (nominally) more likely to share the head-
lines that focused on policy, though this slope was 
much shallower and non-significant (B = −0.20, 
p = .07).
Exploratory analyses. Our main predictor was the 
difference score between the article-level ratings 
of  character focus vs. policy importance. During 
the ratings collected in Part 1, these categories 
were defined and measured as unique constructs 
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because we selected articles that were relatively 
high in one category and low in the other. For 
example, a character-focused headline is neces-
sarily high in character focus and low in policy 
importance. However, it may still be that these 
categories explain unique variance when consid-
ered on their own as opposed to only including 
the difference summary score. To explore this 
Table 1. Coefficients for mixed model predicting likelihood of sharing with partisanship strength and character 
focus versus policy importance. Estimates are unstandardized B coefficients; for political orientation, a higher 
score indicates conservative and a lower score indicates liberal.
Term Estimate SE LLCI ULCI t p
(Intercept) 3.688 0.456 2.815 4.555 8.079 < .001
Age −0.015 0.006 −0.027 −0.004 −2.450 .015
Female −0.557 0.186 −0.929 −0.174 −2.996 .003
Political orientation 0.455 0.102 0.261 0.640 4.483 < .001
Character focus vs. policy importance 1.409 0.280 0.860 1.989 5.026 < .001
Partisanship strength 1.028 0.312 0.460 1.645 3.291 .001
Political orientation x char vs. policy 0.169 0.053 0.071 0.281 3.214 .001
Political orientation x partisanship strength −0.544 0.126 −0.800 −0.298 −4.329 < .001
Character vs. policy x partisanship strength −3.173 0.372 −3.978 −2.461 −8.530 < .001
Note. LLCI = lower level confidence interval; ULCI = upper level confidence interval. 
Figure 1. Depiction of the interaction between political orientation and character focus vs. policy importance 
predicting likelihood of sharing an article on social media.
Note. Plot depicts partial residuals; shaded band indicates 95% CI; a low score on the X-axis indicates a strong character focus 
and a high score indicates importance for policy. 
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possibility, we conducted an exploratory analysis 
where we entered these predictors separately. We 
again calculated a mixed model and included ran-
dom intercepts for participant.
This analysis showed that the extent to which 
an article was character-focused explains unique 
variance from the extent to which an article is 
important for policy. Indeed, participant politi-
cal orientation interacted with both policy 
impact (B = −1.99, p = .003) and character 
focus (B = −1.17, p = .015) and the three-way 
interaction was significant (B = 0.84, p = .008). 
The full set of  coefficients is presented in Table 
S2 in the online supplemental material.
We broke down the three-way interaction by 
examining Republicans and Democrats separately. 
As can be seen in Figure 2, when character-focus 
and policy importance ratings are considered sep-
arately, we can glean a little more information.
For Democrats (shown in the left half  of  
Figure 2), none of  the terms strongly predicted 
sharing; the interaction term was not significant 
(B = −1.26, p = .117). In other words, Democrats 
were equally likely to share news that focused on 
a person’s character and news that was important 
for policy. Full model results are reported in 
Table S3 and simple slopes are presented in Table 
S4 (see online supplemental material).
For Republicans (shown in the right half  of  
Figure 2), the pattern was the opposite. The inter-
action between character focus and policy impor-
tance was strong (B = 4.45, p < .001). Republicans 
were more likely to share news when it was 
focused on a person’s character; this was even 
more likely when the news was important for 
policy (B = 1.56, p < .001). In other words, char-
acter-deprecation headlines that are also impor-
tant for policy were more likely to be shared than 
news that was only important for policy. Full 
model results are reported in Table S3 and simple 
slopes are presented in Table S4.
As an additional analysis, we also explored 
whether performance on the CRT was related to 
a preference for character-focused fake news. 
The reasoning behind this was that character dep-
recation might be intuitively appealing, whereas 
more-reflective people may be more discerning 
(Bronstein et al., 2019; Pennycook & Rand, 2018) 
and prefer news that is actually impactful for pol-
icy. We conducted the same mixed model as in 
our pre-registered analysis, above, except we 
added in the CRT as a predictor and included the 
relevant two-way interactions. The CRT predicted 
less sharing overall (B = −0.32, p = .008). 
However, it did not interact with any of  the arti-
cle-level characteristics or with political orienta-
tion suggesting that it is not an important variable 
to consider (see Table S5 for full model details).
Discussion
In Study 1, we found that Republicans are more 
likely to share fake news when it focuses on a 
person’s character compared to news that is spe-
cifically important for policy, and compared to 
Democrats. However, this first study has some 
major limitations that need to be considered. 
Although we attempted to match the articles as 
closely as possible on all of  the relevant dimen-
sions, an exact match is not possible because the 
literal content of  the headlines differs based on 
party and policy. That is, the people and the 
claims in the pro-Democratic headlines are nec-
essarily different than those described in the 
pro-Republican headlines. As a result, any 
effects observed here may result from the type 
of  fake news content that is created to appeal to 
Republicans versus Democrats.
Study 2
In Study 2, we sought to apply our findings experi-
mentally by creating our own set of  fake news head-
lines. We developed a set of  10 fake news articles 
that all focused on a person’s character (i.e., they did 
not focus on information which would impact pol-
icy). We then modified each headline so that there 
were four versions of  each article by manipulating 
whether the headline (a) was pro-Democrat or pro-
Republican and (b) focused on a specific, named 
person (e.g., “Nancy Pelosi”) or a generic person 
(e.g., “a Democrat”). For example, the following 
four headlines are based on the same content: 
“Republican Representative seen being escorted 
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from local gentleman’s club” (generic, pro-Demo-
crat), “Democratic Representative seen being 
escorted from local gentleman’s club” (generic, pro-
Republican), “Republican Representative Steve 
Scalise seen being escorted from local gentleman’s 
club” (specific, pro-Democrat), “Democratic 
Representative Jerry McNerney seen being escorted 
from local gentleman’s club” (specific, pro-Republi-
can). We also used 10 neutral, non-political head-
lines for comparison. This allows us to control for 
(a) content, (b) strength of  directional partisanship, 
and (c) the specific policy issues. We again pre-regis-




Participants. This study was again conducted in 
two parts. For Part 1, our sample included 404 
participants from Lucid. For Part 2, our sample 
included 306 participants from Lucid (after 
excluding 323 participants who said they would 
not share political content on social media and six 
who indicated “other” gender). Again, the results 
without these exclusions are nearly identical. Full 
demographics are available in the online supple-
mentary materials.
Part 1. During Part 1, participants saw a subset 
of  15 out of  50 headlines; we counterbalanced 
the sets of  headlines and randomized the display 
order. As in Study 1, participants rated each 
headline on (a) whether it focused on a person’s 
character, (b) whether it was important for pol-
icy, and whether it was more favourable for 
Democrats or Republicans. Following our pre-
registered plans (and based on the exploratory 
analysis from Study 2 because it provided more 
detailed information) we calculated two scores 
from these data:
Character focus – The extent to which the 
article focused on someone’s character.
Policy importance – The extent to which the 
article is important for legislation or policy.
Because the headlines were matched exactly 
across political groups, we did not use partisan-
ship strength.
Part 2. During Part 2, subjects viewed 15 headlines 
in randomized order and rated whether they would 
be likely to share each one on social media. Because 
there were 10 articles, each with four versions (pro-
Democrat, pro-Republican, generic target, and spe-
cific target), subjects saw a counterbalanced set of  
articles which included one version of  each of  the 
10 political headlines, along with 5 neutral headlines. 
This was to ensure they would not see two different 
versions of  the same headline. As with Study 1, we 
removed the headlines which did not “match” a per-
son’s political orientation; thus, we analysed 10 rat-
ings from each participant: five political and five 
neutral. After viewing the articles, participants then 
completed the CRT and demographics.
Results
Republicans and Democrats did not differ in their 
likelihood of  sharing neutral (p = .674), generic (p = 
.385), or specific/named (p = .061) articles so we 
carried out our analyses as planned (means for each 
type are displayed in Table S6). We computed a 
mixed model using the article characteristics (e.g., 
character focus vs. policy importance) and the indi-
vidual’s political orientation to predict whether they 
would be likely to share the article on Facebook; we 
included random intercepts for participant. As with 
Study 1, we also included age and gender as control 
variables (though a model without these controls 
yielded nearly identical estimates).
The three-way interaction between political ori-
entation, character focus, and policy importance 
was not significant (B = −0.34, p = .072; see Table 
S7) so we examined only the two-way interactions. 
Though this was not the analysis we pre-registered, 
we do so here for illustrative purposes. The full 
model results are presented in Table 2. As can be 
seen in Figure 3, a strong character-focus score 
was associated with a lower likelihood of  sharing 
headlines for both Democrats (B = −0.33, p < 
.001) and Republicans (B = −0.63, p < .001). 
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Thus, both Democrats and Republicans were less 
likely to share headlines focusing on someone’s 
character and more likely to share articles that were 
directly important for policy.
General discussion
In this research we focused on fake news employ-
ing character deprecation – that is, news which 
attempts to deprecate someone’s character rather 
than focus on issues with direct importance for 
policy and legislation. However, while this may be 
a feature more common to pro-Republican fake 
news, it is not directly responsible for increasing 
the sharing of  fake news. In Study 1, we found 
that Republicans were more likely to share news 
with a negative character focus. But when we 
experimentally manipulated this feature using a 
Table 2. Coefficients for mixed model predicting likelihood of sharing with political orientation, character-
focus, and policy importance in Study 2. Estimates are unstandardized B coefficients; for political orientation, a 
higher score indicates conservative and a lower score indicates liberal.
Term Estimate SE LLCI ULCI T p
(Intercept) 1.557 1.100 −0.730 3.743 1.415 .157
Age −0.013 0.004 −0.021 −0.006 −3.540 < .001
Female −0.213 0.097 −0.416 −0.028 −2.194 .029
Political orientation 0.234 0.150 −0.075 0.538 1.562 .118
Character focus 0.333 0.559 −0.811 1.502 0.595 .552
Policy importance 1.842 0.596 0.639 3.111 3.089 .002
Political orientation x Character focus −0.087 0.032 −0.161 −0.024 −2.741 .006
Political orientation x Policy importance −0.050 0.072 −0.192 0.088 −0.691 .489
Character focus x Policy importance −0.293 0.318 −0.948 0.318 −0.923 .356
Note. LLCI = lower level confidence interval; ULCI = upper level confidence interval. 
Figure 3. Depiction of the interaction between political orientation and article character focus predicting 
likelihood of sharing an article on social media in Study 2.
Note. Plot depicts partial residuals; shaded band indicated 95% CI; a low score on the X-axis indicates a weak character focus 
and a high score indicates strong character focus. 
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novel and balanced set of  fake news headlines, it 
did not increase sharing for either Republicans or 
Democrats. Further, CRT performance was unre-
lated to the sharing of  character-focused news, 
suggesting that it is not more attractive to less-
reflective participants. Thus, character depreca-
tion may be a feature of  some news, but it does 
not appear to consistently make news more likely 
to be shared, nor does it seem to appeal to a par-
ticular political ideology.
This research sheds some light on some of  the 
characteristics of  fake news headlines and the 
characteristics of  those sharing the news. First, 
these data show that conservatism was positively 
correlated with the likelihood of  sharing fake 
news – this result was stronger in Study 1 (B = 
0.46, p < .001) and non-significant in Study 2, 
though the coefficient is still positive (B = 0.23, 
p = .118), but is consistent with past work sug-
gesting that conservatives are more likely to share 
fake news (Allcott & Gentzkow, 2017; Guess 
et al., 2018; Pennycook & Rand, 2019a). 
Furthermore, although people who are more 
reflective (based on CRT performance) shared 
less fake news overall, consistent with past 
research (e.g., Bronstein et al., 2019; Pennycook & 
Rand, 2018), there is no association between CRT 
and whether people share news with a character-
deprecation versus policy focus per se. Evidently, 
there are other aspects of  fake news – e.g., overall 
plausibility (Pennycook & Rand, 2019c) – that 
connect analytic thinking to fake news 
identification.
The present studies investigated only one pos-
sible aspect of  fake news headlines. However, 
there are many other types of  fake news (Tandoc 
et al., 2018) and it could be informative to exam-
ine personality or cognitive differences in sharing. 
For example, fake news that spreads misinforma-
tion specifically about the effectiveness of  a pol-
icy or a new law may be attractive to some people, 
whereas fake news that spoofs quotations by 
celebrities may be attractive to a different demo-
graphic. Likewise, some fake news has a shelf-life 
and may only be believable for a certain period of  
time. Past research has noted that the novelty of  
fake news may be one thing responsible for pro-
moting the sharing of  fake news (Vosoughi et al., 
2018). In contrast, repeated information is more 
believable because of  the illusory truth effect 
(Effron & Raj, 2020; Fazio et al., 2015, 2019; 
Murray et al., 2020; Pennycook et al., 2018), so 
these two competing characteristics may work in 
different directions for different types of  people. 
Finally, future research could examine what por-
tion of  fake news focuses on character depreca-
tion. While this was not a focus of  the current 
investigation, understanding the characteristics 
of  the fake news that does exist has been an 
important aspect of  past work (Acerbi, 2019; 
Allen et al., 2019; Guess et al., 2019) and may lead 
to more insights as to what makes it attractive.
Past research has focused on ways to combat 
fake news. For example, displaying a crowd-
sourced rating of  the trustworthiness of  a news 
source (Pennycook & Rand, 2019a) and simply 
getting people to think about whether the article 
might be accurate (Fazio, 2020; Pennycook 
et al., 2019; Pennycook, Mcphetres, Zhang, & 
Rand, 2020) or prompting people to take more 
time to consider the headline (Bago et al., 2020) 
both reduce the sharing of  misinformation. 
Additionally, getting people to think about the 
qualities of  fake news by having them create 
their own fake news has been shown to be effec-
tive in reducing belief  in fake news (Roozenbeek 
& van der Linden, 2019b). Large-scale imple-
mentation of  a browser-based game in which 
players take the role of  a fake news creator has 
been effective “inoculating” people against fake 
news (Basol et al., 2020; Roozenbeek & van der 
Linden, 2019a; Roozenbeek et al., 2020). 
Research that continues to identify the qualities 
of  fake news that make it attractive and believ-
able to others is an important area for future 
research to continue exploring.
The present research has some strengths and 
limitations. Namely, in Study 1 we used fake news 
that already existed in the real world. Such news 
has features that are dependent on social and 
political circumstances and may reflect specific 
features of  politicians, political landscapes, or the 
idiosyncratic content they discuss. In Study 2, we 
developed our own set of  fake news by modifying 
headlines so that the same headline was matched 
exactly across the partisan divide. Such an action 
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both addresses a limitation of  Study 1 while 
simultaneously reducing and limiting ecological 
validity. Additionally, we recruited participants 
from an online sampling source which may be less 
reflective of  the actual population of  social media 
users. While we took some measures to address 
this – for example, we pre-screened and included 
only social media users and results were similar 
when excluding or including people who share 
political content – this limitation should be con-
sidered when generalizing these results.
An additional limitation is that these results are 
designed to investigate and be applied to the US 
political context. These results do not speak to the 
general characteristics of  non-political fake news, 
nor can they be generalized outside of  the US con-
text. To understand whether the present results are 
generalizable, future research will need to be 
designed with different political and social land-
scapes in mind. For example, political or social 
news relevant to a specific country would need to 
be selected and pre-tested in order to determine 
what characteristics are most relevant. Similarly, 
the idea of  character deprecation may not be appli-
cable in non-political contexts and other character-
istics of  news headlines may be more appropriate.
Finally, when looking at observational data – 
for example, that Republicans share more fake 
news (Allcott & Gentzkow, 2017; Guess et al., 
2019, 2018) – one should be cautious about com-
ing to conclusions about the underlying psychol-
ogy. We show in the present studies how headlines 
derived from the world in an ecological and care-
ful way produced a result that did not hold under 
controlled conditions. That is, we were careful to 
pre-test our stimuli with an independent sample 
and match them on relevant criteria (e.g., partisan-
ship strength). Yet, when we applied our findings 
in an even more carefully controlled experimental 
setting (Study 2), we did not find the same effect. 
Thus, it is important to consider that the pattern 
of  results depends a lot on how fake news is 
defined and the news stimuli used in a study.
In summary, these findings suggest that while 
character deprecation may be a feature of  pro-
Republican news, it is not more attractive to 
Republicans versus Democrats, nor to those 
scoring high on cognitive reflection. News with 
policy implications, whether fake or real, seems 
consistently more attractive to members of  both 
parties. Thus, character deprecation may in be in 
supply, but not in demand.
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